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[L. A. No. 22274.

In Bank.

Aug. 1, 1952.]

DANIEL SCOTT, Appellant, v. HERMAN BURKE,
Respondent.
[L. A. No. 22275.

In Bank.

Aug. 1, 1952.]

SAMUEL GERRY, Appellant, v. HERMAN BURKE,
Respondent.
[1] Death-Instructions-Presumptions.-Where alleged negligent
acts and conduct of a decedent are in issue, an instruction
that deceased is presumed to have exercised ordinary care
for his own concerns is proper except that if the fact proved
by uncontradicted testimony produced by the party seeking
to invoke the presumption, under circumstances which afford
no indication that the testimony is the product of mistake
or inadvertence, is wholly irreconcilable with the presumption,
the latter is dispelled and disappears from the case.
[2] Negligence - Presumptions. - One who by reason of loss of
memory is unable to testify concerning his conduct at and immediately before the time of an accident is entitled to invoke
the presumption that he exercised ordinary care for his own
(2] See Cal.Jur., Negligence, § 122; Am.Jur., ~ egligence, § 290.
McK. Dig. References: [1] Death, § 84; [2,3] Kcgligence, § 124;
(4, 5] Evidence, §§ 127, 140; (6] Evidence, § 136; [7) Evidence,
§ 555(1); [8] Negligence, § 133; [9,10) Evidence, § 129; [11] Negligence, §§ 124, 133; [12] Automobiles, §§ 189, 193(1); [13] Negligence, § 134; [14J Automobiles, §§ 189, 193(1); Negligefi(le, §§ 124,
133; [15] Negligence, § 1; [16) Automobiles, § 307(17).
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concerns, subject to the exception that such presumption is dispelled. by evidence introduced by such party which is wholly
irreconcilable therewith.
[3] Id.-Presumptions.-Presumption that a person takes ordinary
care of his own concerns is evidence (Code Civ. Proc., § 1957;
see, also, §§ 1961, 1963 (1) (4) ), is sufficient to support a verdict
unless dispelled by the "irreconcilable" fact proved by the
party relying on it, and may outweigh positive evidence adduced against it.
[4] Evidence-Presumptions and Inferences.-Both inferences and
presumptions are evidence (Code Civ. Proc., § 1957), and are
weighed by the jury with the other evidence before it.
[5] Id.-Presumptions and Inferences.-Neither a disputable presumption nor an inference is as a matter of law entitled to
be accorded greater weight by the trier of facts than is the
other.
[6] Id.-Presumptions and Inferences.-An inference is merely a
pertinent deduction drawn from circumstantial evidence; i.e.,
from evidence which is circumstantial as to the fact deduced.
[7] Id.-Weight-Circumstantial Evidence.-Circumstantial evidence may outweigh, in convincing force, both the strongest
of disputable presumptions and direct evidence as well.
[8] Negligence-Res Ipsa Loquitur.-Res ipsa loquitur doctrine
raises an inference of negligence, not a presumption.
[9] Evidence-Presumptions and Inferences.-It is for the trier
of fact to determine under the circumstances of each case
whether to give greater weight to an inference than to a
disputable presumption which conflicts therewith, or vice
versa.
[10] Id.-Presumptions and Inferences.-When a presumption is
controverted by other evidence, whether direct or indirect,
an issue of fact is raised which it is the duty of the court
to determine as in other cases, and its conclusion is conclusive
on an appellate court unless it is manifestly without sufficient
support in the evidence.
[11] Negligence-Presumptions and Inferences.-Under appropriate circumstances, both the res ipsa loquitur inference and
the disputable presumptions of innocence and due care are
elements tending towards proof to be considered by the trier
of facts; and it is the function of the trier of facts to determine in the light of all the evidence in the case, including the
opposing inferences and presumptions, whether the proof preponderates in favor of one party and against another, or is
(7] See Cal.Jur., Criminal Law, §§ 265-266, 339, 346, 584; Oal.
Jur., Evidence, §§ 67, 74, 373; Am.Jur., § 1189.
(8] See Oal.Jur., Negligence, § 123; Am.Jur., Negligence, 1295.
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flvenly halanced, and thereupon to resolve the issues in acrordance with the rules relating to the burden of proof.
(12) Automobiles-Presumptions and Inferences.-Although the allegedly negligent motorist in an automobile accident case
against whom the res ipsa loquitur inference arises may by
reason of loss of memory be unable to explain his acts and conduct, where it is shown that the automobile was in good condition, that he was a competent driver and had had several hours
rest and sleep shortly before the accident, and where the
physical evidence indicates that he, while on his side of the
road, applied his brakes and swerved and thereafter repeatedly
released and reapplied the brakes, thus giving rise to a permissible inference that he was confronted with some sudden
emergency and was diligently endea'Voring to cope with it,
such inference, if drawn by the jury, would be a part of the
evidence to be by it weighed with the other evidence, both
direct and indirect, presented by the parties.
[13] Negligence-Res Ipsa Loquitur.-One theory underlying the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is that a defendant in charge of
an instrumentality which causes injury either knows the cause
of the accident or has the best opportunity of ascertaining
it, and plaintiff, having no such knowledge, is compelled to
allege negligence in general terms and to rely on proof of
the happening of the accident to establish it.
[14] AutOmobiles-Presumptions and Inferences: Negligence-Presumptions and Inferences.-Where defendant offers evidence of
his lack of memory and consequent lack of knowledge and
of opportunity to explain the cause of an automobile accident, it is unfair to deprive him of the presumption of due
care merely because plaintiff relies on the res ipsa loquitur
(loctrine. (Disapproving Waite v. Pacific Gas (/,. Elee. Co., 56
Cal.App.2d 191, 132 P.2d 311, and inconsistent implieations
in Smith v. Hollander, 85 Cal.App. 535, 259 P. 958; Ellis v.
Jewett, 18 Cal.App.2d 629, 634-637, 64 P.2d 432; Moeller v.
Market St. By. Co., 27 Cal.App.2d 562, 567, 81 P.2d 475; and
Pezzoni v. City and County of San Francisco, 101 Cal.App.2d
123, 225 P.2d 14.)
[15] Negligence - Inevitable or Unavoidable Accident. - The socalled defcnse of inevitable accident is nothing more than a
dcnial by dt'fendnnt of negligence or a contention that his
negligcnce, if any, was not the proximate cause of the injury.
[16] Automobiles-Instructions-Unavoidable Accident.-In action
for injuries resulting when automobile left highway while
all occupants of car other than defendant driver were asleep,
defendant's instruction on unavoidable accident is properly
given where evidence was produced tending to show that he
was confronted with a sudden emergency which caused him
to apply his brakes and swerve off the highway.
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(39 C.2d 388; 247 P.2d 313]

APPEALS from judgments of the Superior Court of Los
Angelf'sConnty. Allen W. Ashburn, Judge. Affirmed.
Actions for damages for injuries sustained in an automobile accident. Judgment!; for defendant affirmed.
Mark F. Jones and W. L. Engelhardt for Appellant in
1). A. No. 22274.

Knight, Gitelson & Ashton, Robert R. Ashton, Samuel A.
Rosenthal and Leonard G. Ratner for Appellant in L. A.
No. 22275.
Parker, Stanbury, Reese & McGee and Raymond G. Stan- I
bury ·for Respondent.
Campbell, Hayes & Custer and W. R. Dunn, as Amici
Curiae on behalf of Respondent.
SCHAUER, J.-These two actions for personal injuries
arising out of the same automobile accident were consolidated
for trial, judgments on jury verdicts were entered in defendant's favor, and plaintiffs appeal. We h~ve concluded that,
contrary to plaintiffs' contention, the jury were properly instructf'd and the judgments must be affirmed. 1
The uncontradicted evidence, insofar as material to these
appeals, is as follows: At 9 o'clock p. m. on May 23, 1948,
defendant, the two plaintiffs, and three other men left Guaymas, Mexico, in a 1947 Cadillac sedan belonging to plaintiff
Gerry. The car, less than a year old, had gone only 11,000
or 12,000 miles and was in excellent mechanical condition
with good brakes and good tires with lifeguard inner tubes.
The party had gone to Guaymas on a fishing trip, and had
been sharing thc driving. Defendant drove from Guaymas
to Hermosillo, a distance of about 87 miles. Anoth~r member
of thf' party was at the wheel during the four hour drive
from Hermosillo to Nogales. on the border, where they arrived about 4:45 o'clock a. m. on May 24; defendant slept
during this timf'. At Nogales defendant took over the driving again and proceeded north toward Tucson, Arizona; the
lit should he noted that the accident occurred in the State of Arizona,
and that de1'endant makes no contf.:1tion that Arizona haa a "guest
statute" (see Central Copper Co. v. Klefisch (1928), 34 Ariz. 230 (270
P. 629]), or that the California "guest lltatute" ill applicable (aee
Loranger v. Nadeau (1932),215 Cal. 362 [10 P.2d 63, 84 A.L.R. 1264]).
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other members of the party fell asleep and remained sleeping until after the accident occurred. About an hour after
the group left Nogales the automobile, still driven by defendant, traveled diagonally across the left half of the highway
and off an embankment on the left side. "Skid marks"
(according to the transcript, but from the context probably
meaning tire marks), broken and recurrent as if the brakes
had been repeatedly applied, released and reapplied, extended
for a distance of 78 feet across the highway at an angle to
the point where the car went over the embankment. At the
site of the accident the highway was straight, level, and dry;
it was daylight at the time and visibility was good although
there was "a little haze." After leaving the highway the
car traveled 114 feet to the edge of an arroyo, where there
was a sloping bank of approximately 28 feet, at which point
the wheel marks stopped for about 25 feet. The wheel marks
then continued for 35 feet up the other side of the arroyo
where the car came to a stop. It was badly wrecked and
the parties injured.
A police officer reached the scene about 6 :45 o'clock a. m.,
and after an investigation interviewed defendant at a hospital between 8 and 9 0 'clock the same morning. The officer
testified that defendant stated that he did not know his speed
at the time of the accident, that he had previously been 'craveling at a reasonable and prudent speed, and that "I evidently went to sleep. I don't know what happened until
I woke up at the hospital."
Defendant testified that he had no recollection whatsoever
of the accident and could not explain why it occurred; that
his first recollection thereafter was of opening his eyes behind the wheel, and the last recollection he had of any event
prior thereto was of his driving of the car between Nogales
and Tucson; that there was very little traffic on the road
when he took the wheel at Nogales; that he did not remember
applying the brakes or of being interviewed by the police
officer; that he did remember being taken to the hospital and
arriving there; that his highest speed was 60 miles per hour;
that in his best opinion he did not fall asleep prior to the
accident; that he had previously driven the automobile and
was familiar with it. Defendant was rendered temporarily
unconscious by the accident, and suffered a concussion of the
brain and injuries to his head. Medical testimony was introduced to the effect that one who is knocked unconscious
by a blow on the head may suffer a retrograde amnesia by
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which his memory of events immediately preceding his unconscionsness may be obliterated for a period of from a few
seconds to a lltunber of hours, and that under such circumstances the injmcd person would bc unable to recall any of
the events which happened during the period blocked out
of his memory by such amnesia.
Because the other persons in the car were sleeping, they
were unable to testify as to the cause of the accident, but
plaintiffs offered no criticism of defendant's driving while
they wcre awake.
Upon this evidence the court instructed the jury on the
res ipsa loquitur doctrine,2 and also instructed that if the
jury believed that defendant as a result of the shock of the
accident was unable to remember and testify as to his own
conduct or other facts of the accident then a presumption
arose that he "was obeying the law and was exercising ordinary care and doing such acts as an ordinarily prudent person would have done in the same circumstances." (See Code
Civ. Proc., § 1963, subds. 1, 4.) The court further instructed
that "these instructions direct your attention to two conflicting rebuttable presumptions relating to the conduct of
the defendant (one) that he exercised due care at the time
of the accident which presumption arises in the event that
you find that as a result thereof he is unable to remember
the facts pertaining to the same, and (two) that he was
negligent if you find that he was driving on the wrong side
of the road, or that he permitted the automobile to leave
the road in question entirely, or that he fell asleep at the
wheel. If you find the facts to exist which give rise to these
presumptions, then these conflicting presumptions constitute
evidence, the effect of which is to be determined by you, not
by the court; they are to be weighed and considered by you
in the light of and in connection with all of the other evidence, and you ere to give to them, and each of them, such
weight as you deem proper j " and that "In determining
'The instruction reads as follows: "From the happening of the acci·
dent invol,ed in this case there arises an inference that the proximate
cause of the occurrence was some negligent conduct on the part of the
defendant. That infer('nce is a form of e,idence, and if there is none
other tending to overthrow it, or if the inference preponderates over
contrary e,idence, it warrants a verdict for the plaintiff. Therefore,
you should weigh any evidence tending to overeome that inference, bear·
ing in mind that it is incumhent upon the defendant to rebut the in·
ference by showing that he did, in fact, exercise ordinary care and
diligence or that the accident occurred without being proximately caused
b;y any failure of dut;y on his part."
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what caused the accident you are entitled to take into consideration the evidence of the physical facts and to draw
reasonable inferellces therefrom."
Plaintiffs contl:'llU that inasmuch as the res ipsa loquitur
uoctrine is applicable (and defendant does not dispute this;
see Druzanich v. Criley (1942), 19 Ca1.2d 439, 444 [122 P.2d
53]) the court erred to their prejudice in instructing the
jury as to the presumption of due care, and that the judgments must therefore be reversed.
[1] It is settled law that where alleged negligent acts
and conduct of a decedent are at issue before the court and
the "testimony respecting such acts and conduct necessarily
must be produced by witnesses other than the deceased, ...
an instruction that the deceased is presumed to have exercised ordinary care for his own concerns is . . . proper" except that if the fact proved by uncontradicted testimony produced by the party seeking to invoke the presumption, "under
circumstances which afford no indication that the testimony
is the product of mistake or inadvertence . . . is wholly irreconcilable with the presumption . . . the latter is dispelled
and disappears from the case." ( Westberg v. W illde (1939),
14 Ca1.2d 360, 365, 367 [94 P.2d 590] ; see, also, Mar Shee
v. jrlaryland Assurance Corp. (1922), 190 Cal. 1, 9 [210 P.
269] ; Smellie v. Southern Pac. Co. (1931), 212 Cal. 540, 560561 [299 P. 529] ; Rogers v. Interstate Transit Co. (1931),
212 Cal. 36, 39 [297 P. 884J ; Mundy v. Marshall (1937), 8
Ca1.2d 294,296 [65 P.2d 65].) [2] One who by reason of
loss of memory is unable to testify concerning his conduct
at and immediately before the time of the accident is entitled to invoke the same presumption, subject to the same
exception. (Scott v. Sheedy (1940), 39 Cal.App.2d 96, 101
[102 P.2d 575J ; Roselle v. Beach (1942), 51 Cal.App.2d 579,
583 [125 P.2d 77J ; Eastman v. Atchison, T. &- S. F. By. Co.
(1942),51 Cal.App.2d 653, 667 [125 P.2d 564] ; Fietz v. Hubbard (1943).59 Cal.App.2d 124, 131 [138 P.2d 315]; McNear
v. Pacific Greyhound Lines (1944), 63 Cal.App.2d 11, 15
[146 P.2d 34J ; Simon v. City &- CO'ltnty of San Francisco
(1947), 79 Cal.App.2d 590, 598 [180 P.2d 393J; Duvall v.
T.W.A. (1950), 98 Cal.App.2d 106, 110 [219 P.2d 463J;
Russell v. Andersen (1951), 101 Cal.App.2d 684 [226 P.2d
350].) [3] This disputable presumption is by statute declared to be evidence (Code Civ. Proc., § 1957; see, also,
§§ 1961,1963(1)(4», and is sufficient to support a verdict
of a jury unless dispelled by the "irreconcilable" fact proved

)

I

Aug. 1952]

SCOTT tJ. BURKE
[39 C.2d 388; 247 P.2d 313}

395

hy the party relying on it. (Westberg v. Wmde (1939),
~lI,pra" 14 Ca1.2d 360, 365, and cases there cited; Chakrnakjian
\". Lowe (1949), 33 Ca1.2d 308, 313 [201 P.2d 801].) It may
outweigh positive evidence adduced against it. (SmeZZie v.
Southern Pac. Co. (1931), supra, 212 Cal. 540, 549, and cases
there cited; ct. Speck v. Sar'ver (1942), 20 Ca1.2d 585, 588
[128 P.2d 16].)
Plaintiffs argue, however, that it is likewise settled in California by a series of decisions that where, as here, defendant
offers testimony which if believed by the jury would entitle
defendant to benefit by the presumption of due care, it is
nevertheless reversible error to so instruct the jury in a case
in which plaintiff is entitled to benefit by the res ipsa loquitur
inference.
In Smith v. Hollander (1927), 85 Cal.App. 535 [259 P.
958], defendant's automobile ran onto the sidewalk and struck
plaintiff, a pedestrian. It was held that the court correctly
instructed the jury on the res ipsa loquitur doctrine, and
that (p. 540) "Where it was proper to instruct on this doctrine it was proper for the court to refuse defendant's requested instructions . . . upon the presumption of defendant's freedom from negligence." No authority is cited for
the last-quoted statement. It appears from the opinion in
which such statement is made that thc defendant driver herself there testified as to the events leading' up to the accident;
h!'nce, the presumption of due care would have been unavailable to her regardless of whether res ipsa loquitur applied,
and, upon the facts of the case, the ruling was correct.
In Ellis v. Jewett (1937), 18 Cal.App.2d 629, 634-637 [64
P.2cl432], defendants appealed from an order granting plaintiff a new trial on the ground of error in the instructions.
'fhe court had instructed on the res ipsa loquitur doctrine,
and had also told the jury that "There is a presumption in
law that ... [defendant] was free from fault in driving
the automobile, and this i.s a presumption which continues
throughout the entire case, and must be comidered by you
in deciding the issues involved in the co,~e. No presumption
of negligence on the part of . . . rdefendant] arises from the
mere happening of the accident . . ." The court on appeal
held that the res ipsa loquitur instruction had been proper
and further held, without citation of authority, that the instruction on presumption of freedom from fault was therefore erroneous and prejudicial. Under the circumstances of
that case we may assume that the ruling is correct but that

396

SCOTT

v.

BURKE

[39 C.2d

does not mean that the principle must as a matter of law
inevitably be applicable in all res ipsa loquitur situations
regardless of other pertinent circumstances. In the cited
opinion it does not appear that defendant driver did not
himself testify as to the events leading up to the accident;
moreover, the positive instruction that there was a presumption of freedom from fault and that it "continues throughout the entire case," obviously states a proposition much
more strongly and positively phrased in favor of defendant
than does the instruction given in the instant case, to the
effect that the due care presumption arose only if the jury
believed that defendant was unable to remember and testify
concerning the accident.
In Moeller v. Market St. Ry. Co. (1938),27 Cal.App.2d 562,
567 [81 P.2d 475], a streetcar started while plaintiff, a passenger, was alighting. Judgment was entered on a verdict
in plaintiff's favor, and on appeal by defendant it was held,
in reliance on Smith v. Hollander (1927), supra, 85 Cal.App.
535, that "An instruction that the law presumes that the
carmen used the requisite care and acted as reasonably prudent persons was properly refused as the doctrine of res
ipsa loquitur raised an inference of negligence." In this
case also, however, both the conductor and the motorman
of the streetcar testified concerning the accident, and there
was therefore no ba~is for reliance by defendants on the due
care presumption regardless of the application of the res
ipsa loquitur doctrine.
In Waite v. Pacific Gas &; Elec. Co. (1942), 56 Ca1.App.
2d 191 [132 P.2d 311], plaintiff was injured by a fall resulting from a sudden jerk of the streetcar on which she
was 'a passenger. The car ,vas operated by only one man,
who died prior to the trial. No witness to the accident other
than plaintiff was produced. On defendant's appeal from
a judgment for plaintiff, following a jury trial, it was held
that the jury was correctly instructed on the res ipsa loquitur
doctrine, and that therefore (in reliance upon Smith v. Hollander (1927), supra, and Moeller v. Market St. Ry. Co.
(1938), supra, defendant was not entitled to instructions on the
presumption of due care. The court comments (p. 202),
"The application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur raises
an inference of negligence against the defendant. It would
be contradictory ... also to instruct the jury there is a
preflumption the drfendant acted with due care."

)
Aug. 1952]

SCOTT V. BURKE

397

[39 C.2d 388; 247 P.2d 313]

In Pezzoni v. City (~ County of San Francisco (1950), 101
Cal.App.2d 123, 124: [225 P.2d 14], plaintiff, a streetcar passenger, was injured when the ear "stopped with a sudden
jerk. " The jury found for defendants, and the trial court
granted a new trial "on the ground of errors of law occurring at the trial." The jury had been instructed on both
res ipsa loquitur and the due care presumption. On appeal
by defendant the court commented that "The jury was thus
faced with the metaphysical responsibility of weighing a
presumption of care against an inference of negligence. The
courts haye held that in a res ipsa case it it not proper to
give an instruction on the presumption of care. [Citing the
Smith, Moeller, and \Vaite cases, sttpra.]" The holding was
that because instructions had been given on both res ipsa
loquitur and the presumption of due care, as well as because of other errors in the instructions, the trial court had
acted within its discretion in granting the new trial. In
this cited case, again, there is no suggestion that defendant
claimed the existence of facts (death or loss of memory on
the part of the operators of the streetcar) which would entitle it to the instruction as to the presumption of due care.
Assuming that the aboye cited and discussed decisions of
the District Court of Appeal actually set forth the view contended for by the plaintiffs,3 which would deny to a party
in a civil action (whether plaintiff or defendant) against
whom the res ipsa loquitur inference is applicable the benefit
of the presumptions of due care and of innocence, where an
otherwise acceptable basis for those presumptions has been
established, we nevertheless conclude that sound considerations of law, logic and justice unite with impelling force
against our acceptance and perpetuation of that view.
[4] In California both inferences and presumptions are
by statute declared to be evidence (Code Civ. Proc., § 1957),
and are weighed by the jury with the other evidence before
it. [5] Of the two, neither a presumption (disputable)'
nor an inference is as a matter of law entitled to be accorded greater weight by the trier of facts than is the other.
'Waite v. Pacific Gas 4' Elec. Co. (1942), supra, 56 Cal.App.2d 191,
appears to be the only one which upon its facts squarely presents the
basis for the bolding.
'Section 1961 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that •• A presumption (unless declared by law to be conclusive) may be controverted by other evidence, direct or indirect; but unless so controverted
the jury are bound to find according to the presumption."

)

398

SCOTT

v.

BURKE

[39 C.2d

Any suggestion that a disputable presumption, merely as
such, has greater weight than an inference is an erroneous
concept. Thus. while an inference is defined in section 1958
of the Code of Civil Procedure as "a deduction which the
reason of the jury makes from the facts proved, without an
express directioll of law to that effect," and a presumption
is declared to be "a deduction which the law expressly directs
to be made from particular facts" (Code Civ. Proc., § 1959),
there is no pro\'ision of law which requires that a disputable
presumption mnst be accorded greater weight than the reason of the fact trier suggests should be given to an opposing
inference. [6] Actually, an inference is nothing more nor
less than a pertinent deiluction drawn from circumstantial
evidence; i.e., from eYirlel1ce which is circumstantial as to
the fact deduceil. [7] And circumstantial evidence may
outweigh, in convincing force, both the strongest of disputable
presumptions (soml'times said to be the presumption of innocence; see discussion and cases cited in 8 Cal.Jur. pp. 190192, §§ 265-266; and p. 279, § 339; pp. 290-291, § 346 ; p. 593,
§ 584; 10 CaLJur. 754, 762-764; People v. Shorts (1948), 32
Cal.2d 502, 507 [197 P.2d 330J) and direct evidence as well
(Gmy v. Southern Pac. Co. (1944), 23 Ca1.2d 632, 641 [145
P.2d 561] ; see 10 CaLTur. 1157-1158, and cases there cited).
[8] The res ipsa loquitur doctrine raises "an inference
of negligence, not a presumption." (Anderson v. I. M. Jameson Corp. (1936),7 Ca1.2d 60,66 [59 P.2d 962J.) [9] However, just as either an inference or a presumption may outweigh positive evidence adduced against it by the opposing
party, so may either outweigh the other; i.e., it is for the
tric>r of fact to oetl'rmine under the circumstances of each
('ase whether to give greater weight to an inference than to
a disputable presumption which con:fl.icts therewith, or vice
Yersa. [10] Although disputable presumptions have sometimes been characterized as "the weakest and least satisfactory charactc>r of evidence" nevertheless, as hereinabove
indicatf'rl. "When [a presumption is] controverted by other
evidence, whether <1irect or indirect, an issue of fact is raised
which it is the rlnty of the court to determine as in other
cases, anrl its conclusion is conclusive upon an appellate court
unless it is manifestly without sufficient support in the evidence (Fanning v. Green (1909), 156 Cal. 279 [282] [104
P.308])." (Simonton v. Los Angeles T. & S. Bank (1928),
20!) Cal. 252, 258 [270 P. 672] ; see, also, Smell1'e v. Southern
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Pac. 00. (1931), supra, 212 Cal. 540, 549, and cases there
citrd.) [11] Thus, it may be stated as a legal concept that
it was for the jury, in the light of all the circumstances
of the case in evidence before them, to determine whether
greater weight should be given to the res ipsa loquitur inference or to the presumptions of innocence and due care
which conflicted with such inference. More accurately what
that legal concept means-and exactly what its application
in the instant case li means-is this: That under appropriate
circumstances, such as appear in this case, both the res ipsa
loquitur inference and the dispntable presumptions of innocence and due care are elements tending towards proof to
be considered by the trier of facts; and that it is the function of the trier of facts to determine in the light of all the
evidence in the case, including the opposing inferences and
presumptions, whether the proof preponderates in favor of
one party and against another, or is evenly balanced, and
thereupon to resolve the issues in accordance with the rules
relating to the burden of proof.
Plaintiffs, in further argument against the availability of
the innocence-due care presumptions in any case wherein a
party is entitled to the res ipsa loquitur inference, cite Druzanich v. Oriley (1942), supra, 19 Ca1.2d 439, 444, and similar casps. From Druzanich they quote in part as follows:
"The application of the doctrine [of res ipsa loquitur] does
not give a plaintiff an absolute right to a judgment in every
easf'. [Citations.l It does not shift the burden of proof,
and when the defendant proiluces eviilence to rebut the inferencf' of negligence, it is ordinarily a question of fact
whether the inference has been dispelled. [Citations.] Howrver, the trier of fact cannot arbitrarily disregard the inference. As stated in Ales v. Ryan (1936), 8 Ca1.2d 82, 99
r64 P.2d 409] : 'The rule is well settled by a multitude of
ilrrisions of the appellate courts of this state to the effect
that the inference of negligence which is created by the
rille res ipsa loquitu,r is in itself evidence which may not
be disregariled by the jury and which in the absence of any
othrr evidence as to negligence, necrssitates a verdict in favor
of the plaintiff. It is incumbent on the defendant to rebut
the prima facie case so created by showing that he used the
"Inasmuch as the two eases disposed of by this opinion were consoli·
,lnt('d for trial and for argument on appeal they are sometimes referred
to h('rein liS a single ease.
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care required of him under the circumstances. The burden
is cast upon the defendant to meet or overcome the prima
facie case made against him.''' Judgment for the defendant
was reversed. In reaching its conclusion the court pointed
out that defendant herself gave testimony which indicated a
lack of due care on her part and completely failed to rebut
the inference of negligence. By contrast, defendant in the
instant case offered testimony which, if believed by the jury,
entitled him to an instruction on the due care and innocence
presumptions and to have such presumptions weighed by the
jury together with the other evidence in the case. Clearly,
the Druzanich case (and the same is true as to the similar
cited cases) is not authority to the contrary.
[12] Neither does reason suggest a contrary holding. That
a portion of the evidence may consist of the inference of negligence which arises under the res ipsa loquitur doctrine would
not seem to present an insurmountable obstacle to the jury
in reaching its verdict. Although the aUf'gedly negligent party
against whom the res ipsa inference arises may by reason
of death or loss of memory be himself unable to explain his
acts and conduct, it will rarely if ever occur that other evidence of pertinent circumstances such 8S events occnrring
before the accident, as well as of conditions as they are
fOlmd to exist thereafter, will not be available for presentation to and consideration by the jury. Thus, in the prellent case, it was shown that tbe automobile waR in good
condition, tbat the defendant was a competent driver, was
familiar with the car, had been driving carefully and had
bad several hours rest and sleep shortly before the accident;
furtbermore, the physical evidence indicates that defendant
driver while on his own side of the road applied his brakes
and swerved, and thereafter repeatedly released and reapplied
the brakes, thus giving rise to a permissible inference that
he was confronted with some sudden emergency and was
diligently endeavoring to cope with it; snch inference, if
drawn by the jnry, would be a part of the evidence to be
by it wei!,l"hed with the other evidence, both direct and indirect, presented by the parties.
It is also to be noted that j1l1'ies are frequently confrontl'd with the necessity of deciding as to the truth or
falsity of directly conflicting storiell related by the witnesses
before them. yet it would RCllrcely be snggested that the
production by one party of positive testimony in his own
favor would preclude his opponent from relying upon eontra-
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dictory testimony, merely because the jury might find difficulty in weighing the evidence and reaching a verdict.
[13] Moreover, one of the theories underlying the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, and a factor in determining whether
it should be available in a case such as this, is the proposition
that "a defendant in charge of an instrumentality which
causes injury either knows the cause of the accident or has
the best opportunity of ascertaining it, and the plaintiff,
having no such knowledge, is compelled to allege negligence
in general terms and to rely upon proof of the happening
of the accident in order to establish it. [Citations.]" (See
Leet v. Union Pac. R. 00. (1944), 25 Ca1.2d 605, 619 [155
P.2d 42, 158 A.L.R. 1008] ; Anderson v. I. M. Jameson Oorp.
(1936), supra, 7 Ca1.2d 60, 64, the latter quoting from Kenney v. Antonetti (1931), 211 Cal. 336, 339 [295 P. 341}.)
[14] Where, as here, defendant offers evidence of his lack
of memory and consequent lack of knowledge and of opportunity to explain the cause of the accident, it would appear
unfair to deprive him of the presumption of due care merely
because plaintiff relies on the res ipsa loquitur doctrine. The
contrary holding in Waite v. Pacific Gas & Elec. 00. (1942),
Sllpra, 56 Cal.App.2d 191, and inconsistent implications in
Smith v. Hollander (1927), supra, 85 Cal.App. 535; Ellis
v. Jewett (1937), supra, 18 CaJ.App.2d 629, 634-637; Moeller
v. Market St. Ry. 00. (1938), supra, 27 Cal.App.2d 562, 567;
and Pezzoni v. Oity & 001tnty of San Francisco (1950), supra,
]01 Cal.App.2d 123, are disapproved.
Plaintiffs' further contention that the evidence fails to
support the verdicts is untenable, since the presumptions
of due care and of innocence, as noted hereinabove, constitute
sufficient evidence to support the verdicts.
[15, 16] Finally. plaintiffs urge that it was error to give
defendant's requested instruction on unavoidable accident.
However, " ... the so-called defense of inevitable accident
is nothing more than a denial by defendant of negligence or
a contention that his negligence, if any, was not the proximate caUfle of the injury." (Parker v. Womack (1951), 37
Ca1.2d 116. 120-121 [230 P.2d 823], quoting from Polk v.
Oity of Lo.~ Angeles (1945), .26 Ca1.2d 519, 542-543 [159
P.2d 9311.) Dpfendant does deny negligence in the present
case, pvidence wa.c; prodncpd tending to show that he was
confrontpd with' a sudden emergency which causeq him to
apply his brakrs and swerve off the highway, and the in-
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struction complained of properly submitted to the jury the
law applicable upon this tenable view of the evidence.
For the reasons above stated the judgments are affirmed.
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., and Spence, J., concurred.
'rRAYNOR, J.-I dissent.
The facts and issues in these cases are simple and could
easily have been presented to the jury in an intelligible manner. The record aptly illustrates how much confusion and
prejudice can result when presumptions and inferences are
regarded as evidence and a presumption is invoked against
the party who already has the burden of proving that the
presumed fact does not exist. (See dissenting opinion in
Speck v. Sarver, 20 Ca1.2d 585, 590 (128 P.2d 16].)
The automobile in which plaintiffs were riding veered from
the right to the left side of the highway and crashed into
the bank of a ravine. Plaintiffs were asleep at the time, and
defendant driver testified that he had no memory of the occurrence. The automobile was in excellent condition before
the accident, and skid marks indicated that the brakes were
applied while it was still on the right side of the highway.
To recover judgment it was incumbent upon plaintiffs to
prove that the accident resulted from defendant's negligence
in operating the vehicle. To discharge this burden plaintiffs were entitled to rely upon the inference of negligence
arising under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur based on the
fact that properly driven automobiles do not ordinarily
leave the highway. (Druzanich v. Criley, 19 Ca1.2d 439,
445 [122 P.2d 53].)
"An inference is a conclusion as to the existence of a
material fact that a jury may properly draw from the existence of certain primary facts." (Blank v. Coffin, 20 Ca1.2d
457, 460 [126 P.2d 868].) Unless the facts are such that
only one inference may reasonably be drawn therefrom, it
is ordinarily for the jury to determine in a particular case
what inference, if any, should be drawn. (Code Civ. Proc.,
§ 1958; Blank v. Coffin, supra, at p. 461.) If the doctrine
of res ipsa loquitur is to be treated as one dealing with no
more than a certain type of circumstantial evidence, the inference arising thereunder should be treated like any other,
and even in the absence of evidence to the contrary, the jury
should be compelled to draw it only if reasonable minds could
not differ.
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If, however, the facts arc peculiarly within the knowledge
of one of thl' parties, or a special relationship exists between
them, there may be rl'ason to require of defendant an explanation if he is to escape judgment against him. "Thus,
when bailed goods are lost or destroyed, it is reasonable to
require the bailee to prove that the loss was not owing to
his negligence. (George v. Bekins Van «t Storage Co., 33
Cal.2d 834, 839-841 [205 P.2d 1037].) Again, when a carrier
has undertaken to carry a passenger safely it is reasonable
to enforce that duty by requiring the carrier to explain an
accident. (See Prosser, Res Ipsa Loq'lJitur in California,
37 Cal.L.Rev. 183, 185.) The relationship between an unconscious patient and those who have undertaken to treat
him may also be one that justifies placing the burden of proof
on the attendants if they are to escape liability for an unusual injury inflicted while the patient is unconscious." (Raber
v. Tumin, 36 Ca1.2d 654, 664 [226 P.2d 574], dissent.) Since
in the ordinary case where an automobile leaves the highway, the driver will be the person best able to explain why
the accident happened, it is not unfair to give the res ipsa
loquitur inference arising under such circumstances the additional procedural effect accorded to a presumption and direct
the jury to find defendant negligent if he fails to make any
explanation. (See Druzanich v. Criley, 19 Ca1.2d 439, 445
[122 P.2d 53] ; Ybarra v. Spangard, 25 Cal.2d 486, 490 [154
P.2d 687, 162 A.L.R. 1258] ; Dierman v. Providenc.e Hospital,
31 Ca1.2d 290, 295 r188 P.2d 12].)
In the present case, however, defendant introduced evidence that he was in no better position than plaintiffs to explain the accident. If the jury should believe this evidence,
it would be unfair to give to the inference arising under the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur the procedural effect of a presumption, for the only justification for so doing would have
disappeared from the case. On the other hand, the fact that
defendant through no fault of his own may be unable to
explain the accident in no way weakens whatever probative
value the evidence of the happening of the accident and the
surrounding circumstances may have. The jury should still
be at liberty to draw the inference of negligence if it sees fit.
Accordingly, the jury should have been instructed to find
defendant liable if it concluded that he had the ability to
explain the accident and failed to do so. It should also have
bet>n instructed that if it found that defendant had no memory
of the accident because of amnesia, it should base its verdict
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solely on the evidence presented and find defendant liable
only if it concluded that the accident was more probably
than not the result of negligence on his part. Under such
instructions the mental processes involved in reaching a verdict would not have been difficult. If the jury disbelieved
defendant's evidence that he was suffering from amnesia, his
liability would be established. If it believed that evidence,
it would then have to decide only whether or not to draw the
inference from the occurrence of the accident and the surrounding circumstances that defendant was negligent. If
it could not decide whether or not to draw that inference
it would find for defendant because of plaintiffs' failure to
discharge their burdcn of proof.
Instead the jury was presented with a hopelessly confusing task. After instructing the jury on the doctrine of res
ipsa loquitur and the presumption of due care the court
stated: "These instructions direct your attention to two conflicting rebuttable presumptions relating to the conduct of
the defendant (one) that he exercised due care at the time
of the accident which presumption arises in the event that
you find that as a result thereof he is unable to remember
the facts pertaining to the same, and (two) that he was negligent if you find that he was driving on the wrong side of
the road, or that he permitted the automobile to leave the
road in question entirely, or that he fell asleep at the wheel.
If you find the facts to exist which give rise to these presumptions, then these conflicting presumptions constitute evidence, the effect of which is to be determined by you, not
by the court; they are to be weighed and considered by you
in the light of and in connection with aU of the other evidence, and you are to give to them, and each of them, such
weight as you deem proper."
How could the jury understand this instruction in which
new evidence is spontaneously generated f By what mental
process could it weigh these rules of law or logic against
the facts upon which it was told they were based f The
jury might conceivably make some sense out of the part of
the instruction that the presumption of negligence was evidence. That presumption or inference has a logical basis.
The jury could understand that a presumption or inference
of negligence might be drawn from the fact that the automobile left the highway. It might divine, from the instruction that this presumption constituted evidence that it should
weigh, that the court was conveying only the idea that in
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its deliberations the jury should keep in mind that BOme
of the evidence would support an inference of negligence,
and that in arriving at a conclusion it should consider that
inference as a definite possibility.
When the jury turned to a consideration of the presumption of due care, however, it would find it impossible to apply
any such reasoning as it might have applied to the presumption of negligence. Here it would see that there was no
rational relationship between defendant's amnesia and his
due care. The proposition that defendant had amnesia does
not lead to the conclusion that he exercised due care. Accordingly, the jury could not assume that when the court
described the presumptions as evidence, it intended only to .
call tlte jury's attention to the various logical inferences it
might draw from the evidence. It could assume only that
it must consider two new items of conflicting evidence whose i
nature it could not understand.
How then would it weigh this substituted evidence t These
presumptions were not witnesses whose demeanor might be
observed. The facts upon which they were based were not!
in conflict, so the jury could not look to them to determine .
which presumption was superior. It might in desperation
conclude that the two presumptions cancelled each other, leaving neither evidence of negligence from the occurrence of
the accident nor evidence of defendant's due care. Its mind
now a blank, the jury would remember the instruction that
the burden of proof was upon plaintiffs and, acocrdingly,
return a verdict for defendant. Herein lies the vice of instrncting the jUl'y that a presumption exists that operates
against the party having the burden of proof, and that the
presumption constitutes evidence.
Upon plaintiffs rested the burden of proving that it was
more probable than not that the accident was caused by defpndant's negligence. That burden was enlarged by the instruction that there was a presumption of due care and that
the presumption was evidence. Plaintiffs were thus placed
under· the burden. not only of proving by a preponderance
of the evidence that defendant was negligent, but also of
somehow dispelling arlditional ·i'evidence" that the jury could
not rationally ('val}latf'. This additional burden was placed
upon plaintiffs solely because defendant was unable to remember what happened. It is true· that any disparity between the parties with respect to their" sources of inforinationmay"justify placing the burden of proof oil one rathet
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than the other or creating a presumption in favor of the
party with the burden of proof. Thus if the burden had
been upon defendant to prove that he was not negligent,
his inability to present evidence because of his amnesia might
justify a presumption in his favor that he was exercising
due care. Similarly, in jurisdictions where the burden is
upon the plaintiff to prove that he was not guilty of contributory negligcnce, it is not unfair to create a presumption in his favor, if he is dead or otherwise unable to testify.
In this case, however, defendant received all the procedural
protection to which he was entitled when the burden of proof
was placed upon plaintiffs. There is no general rule of law
that the quantum of proof required of the party bearing
the burden of proof increases beyond the usual preponderance of probabilities because his opponent happens to be
ignorant of the facts. Even if one assumed the wisdom of
such a rule, its operation should be explained' to the jury
in an intelligible manner. The jury should be instructed,
not that there is a presumption that is evidence, but that
because of defendant's inability to testify they should demand of plaintiffs a higher degree of proof. But should
plaintiffs be required to proye their case by clear and eonvincing evidence or even beyond a reasonable doubt' Clearly,
no such burden could in justice be imposed upon plaintiffs
in this case. They were in no better position than defendant
was to explain the accident. There was no danger that they
might fabricate testimony that defendant would be helpless
to refute. The evidence with respect to the accident was
fonnd only in the physical facts. Plaintiffs were entitled
to have the jury consider those facts and then decide, unhampered by any presumption against them, whether it was
more probable than not that defendant's negligence caused
the accident. The evidence of defendant's amnesia was of
course properly in the case. If believed, it served to prevent
a directed verdict for plaintiffs on the basis of res ipsa loquitur. By showing why defendant could not explain the accident, it prevented the jury from inferring from his silence
that if he spoke he would confess his case.
I would reverse the judgments.
Edmonds, .T., concurred.
CARTER, J.-I dissent.
While I agree, generally, with the views expressed in the
majority opinion with respect to the law appliCJl.bJe to ju-
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ferences and presumptions, it was error, in my opinion, to
give an instruction on unavoidable accident. My views with
respect to instructions of this character are set forth in my
dissent in Parker v. Womack, 37 Cal.2d 116, 123 [230 P.2d
823]. A.nyone familiar with the trial of personal injury
cases can appreciate the prejudicial effect of such an instruction in a case of this type, and I would, therefore, reverse the judgment on this ground.
Appellants' petition for a rehearing was denied A.ugust 28,
1952. Edmonds, J., Carter, J., and Traynor, J., were of the

opinion that the petition should be granted.
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